

CLAT 2020 LLM Mock Test 6 by CLATapult and CLATalogue

- I. Freedom of speech and expression conferred on him by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void under article 13 (1) of the Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right aforesaid. The Advocate-General of Madras appearing on behalf of the respondents raised a preliminary objection, not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32, but to the petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first instance. He contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He cited criminal revision petitions under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, applications for bail and applications for transfer under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been given in certain matters to the High Court and the Court of a lower grade, a rule of practice has been established that a party should proceed first to the latter Court for relief before resorting to the High Court. He

referred to *Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha* where such a rule of practice was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain American decisions *Urquhart v. Brown* and *Hooney v. Kolohan* as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial remedies remained open to the applicant in Federal and State Courts should be exhausted before the remedy in the Supreme Court---be it habeas corpus or certiorari-- would be allowed. We are of opinion that neither the instances mentioned by the learned Advocate General nor the American decisions referred to by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of the Indian Constitution. That article does not merely confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the (1) I.L.R. 56 All. 158. (2) 205 U. S. 179. (3) 294 U.S. 103.

1. The above excerpt is from which judgment?

- a. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras; 1950 AIR 124
- b. Indra Sawhney v. UOI; 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
- c. A.K Gopalan v UOI; 1950 AIR 27
- d. None of the above

2. Who among the following was not a part of the bench in the above judgment?

- a. Hon'ble Justice Fazal Ali (Retd.)
- b. Hon'ble Justice Kania (Retd.)
- c. Hon'ble Justice M. Patanjali Mahajan (Retd.)
- d. Hon'ble Justice Chandrachud (Retd.)

3. Who among the following judges gave the dissenting opinion?

- a. Hon'ble Justice Fazal Ali (Retd.)
- b. Hon'ble Justice Kania (Retd.)
- c. Hon'ble Justice M. Patanjali Mahajan (Retd.)
- d. Hon'ble Justice Sudhi Ranjan Mukherjea (Retd.)

4. Constitutionality of which statute was called into question in the above referred judgment?

- a. Prohibition of forcible Conversion of Religion Ordinance.
- b. Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949
- c. Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, 1965
- d. Tamil Nadu Clinical Establishment Act, 1997

5. Which one of the following is the dissenting opinion of the judgment?

- a. Restrictions which s. 9(1-A) authorized are within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution and s. 9 (1-A) is not therefore unconstitutional or void.
- b. Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution
- c. Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom propagation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.
- d. None of the above

II. The fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution represent the basic values cherished by the people of this country since the Vedic times and they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. But these freedoms are not and cannot be absolute, for absolute and unrestricted freedom of one may be destructive of the freedom of another. In a well ordered civilized society, freedom can only be regulated freedom. It is obvious that Article 21 though couched in negative language confers fundamental right to life and personal liberty. The question that arise for consideration on the language of Art. 21 is as to what is the meaning and content of the words 'personal liberty' as used in this Article. In A. K.

Gopalan's case a narrow interpretation was placed on the words 'personal liberty.' But there was no definite pronouncement made on this point since the question before the court was not so much the interpretation of the words 'personal liberty' as the interrelation between Arts. 19 and 21. [667 G-H, 668 D-E, G, H, 669 A] interpretation of the words 'personal liberty' as the interrelation between Arts. 19 and 21. [667 G-H, 668 D-E, G, H, 669 A]

6. The above excerpt is from which judgment?

- a. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 597
- b. Kharak Singh v. State of UP and ors., AIR 1963 1295
- c. R.C Cooper v. UOI, [1973] 3 SCR 530
- d. None of the above

7. Who among the following was not a part of the bench in the referred judgment?

- a. Hon'ble Justice Hameedulla Beg (Retd)
- b. Hon'ble Justice Y.V Chandrachud (Retd)
- c. Hon'ble Justice P.N Bhagwati (Retd)
- d. None of the above

8. The Passport Act of 1967 was enacted after which case?

- a. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 597
- b. Satwant Singh Sawheny v. D. Ramarathan, (1967) 3 S.C.R 525
- c. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
- d. None of the above

9. Which judgment was over ruled by this judgment with regard to the nexus between Article 14, 19 and 21?

- a. Kharak Singh v. State of UP and ors., AIR 1963 1295
- b. R.C Cooper v. UOI, [1973] 3 SCR 530
- c. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
- d. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 597

10. Which of the followings points held in the above referred case is not correct?

- a. The court held that the scope of “*personal liberty*” is not to be construed in narrow and stricter sense. The court said that personal liberty has to be understood in the broader and liberal sense. Therefore, Article 21 was given an expansive interpretation. The court obligated the future courts to expand the horizons of Article 21 to cover all the Fundamental Rights and avoid construing it in narrower sense.
 - b. The right to travel abroad as held in *Satwant Singh* is within the scope of guarantees mentioned under Article 21.
 - c. The court while delivering this landmark judgment changed the landscape of the Constitution by holding that though the phrase used in Article 21 is “*due process*” instead of “*procedure established by law*” however, the procedure must be free from arbitrariness and irrationality. Even though the Constitution makers must be respected, but they never intended to plant such a self – destructive bomb in the heart of the Constitution. They were never of the mind that the procedure need not necessarily be reasonable, just and fair. They drafted this Constitution for the protection of the “*people of India*” and such interpretation of Article 21 will be counter-productive to the protection offered by the Constitution.
- III. In view of the Presidential Order dated 27th June 1975 no person has any locus to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is based on extraneous considerations.

11. Which case in Indian History is known as the Habeas Corpus Case?

- a. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras; 1950 AIR 124
- b. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207
- c. Re. Berubari v. UOI
- d. None of the above

12. What is the meaning of the term 'Habeas Corpus'?

- a. You must have the body
- b. What is your authority
- c. You must perform your duty
- d. Judicial control

13. Who out of the following was a judge in the above referred case?

- a. J. Bonde
- b. J. Desai

- c. J. M. Hameedullah
- d. None of the above

14. Whose election as prime minister was brought into question in the above referred act?

- a. Rajiv Gnadhi
- b. Morarji Desai
- c. Atal Vihari Bajpayee
- d. Indira Gandhi

15. Section 16A(9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act is constitutionally valid; the bench headed by the then Chief Justice of India, Justice A.N. Ray, along with Justices M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati and Justice H R Khanna. Who among the following gave the dissenting opinion in the judgment?

- a. Justices M.H. Beg
- b. Y.V. Chandrachud
- c. Justice A.N. Ray
- d. None of the above

Shakespeare through one of his characters in a play says —What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet!. The said phrase, in its basic sense, conveys that what really matters is the essential qualities of the substance and the fundamental characteristics of an entity but not the name by which it or a person is called. Getting further deeper into the meaning, it is understood that the name may be a convenient concept for identification but the essence behind the same is the core of identity. Sans identity, the name only remains a denotative term. Therefore, the identity is pivotal to one’s being. Life bestows honour on it and freedom of living, as a facet of life, expresses genuine desire to have it. The said desire, one is inclined to think, is satisfied by the conception of constitutional recognition, and hence, emphasis is laid on the identity of an individual which is conceived under the Constitution. And the sustenance of identity is the filament of life. It is equivalent to authoring one’s own life script where freedom broadens everyday. Identity is equivalent to divinity.

16. In which case was section 377 of the IPC decriminalized by the Supreme Court?

- a. Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI
- b. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerela
- c. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation
- d. None of the above

17. Which Justice was not a part of the bench in the above referred matter?

- a. Dipak Misra,
- b. R. F. Nariman,
- c. D. Y. Chandrachud
- d. None of the Above

18. Which of the following judgments were relied upon while passing the above referred judgment?

- a. Manoj Narula v. UOI
- b. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi
- c. Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India
- d. All of the above

19. Which of the following is a precondition to acts coming under section 377?

- a. consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature
- b. consent devoid of any duress or coercion
- c. None of the above
- d. Both a and b

20. The above referred judgment was of what nature?

- a. Prospective
- b. Retrospective
- c. All pending cases to be guided by it.
- d. None of the above

Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the BCCI in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.19546 of 2016, has argued that the expression “arbitral proceedings” in both parts of Section 26 refers only to proceedings before an arbitrator and is the same in both parts. Consequently, it is clear that it is only arbitral proceedings that have commenced after 23rd October, 2015 and Court proceedings in relation thereto, that will be governed by the Amendment Act. If the arbitral proceedings have commenced under the old Act, then those proceedings as well as all Court proceedings in relation thereto, would be governed only by the old Act. According to him, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be attracted, insofar as Court proceedings are concerned, when the first part of Section 26 is applied. According to him, the second part would not become superfluous on his reading of Section 26, as the option given to the parties would be given only on application of the first part and not the second. According to the learned senior counsel, the judgment in Thyssen (*supra*) is determinative of the present case, inasmuch as an entirely new challenge procedure under Section 34 is laid down by the amendments made in 2015, somewhat like the challenge procedure laid down in the original Section 34 of the 1996 Act, when contrasted with Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. According to the learned senior counsel, party autonomy must be respected, and this being the position, parties who have entered into agreements in the expectation that the old regime will apply cannot suddenly be foisted with a completely different regime under the Amendment Act.

21. The above excerpt is from a recent judgment that has changed the face of the challenge procedure to an arbitral award, laid down under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Which judgment is this?

- a. Hindustan Construction Company v UOI,
- b. BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd, (2018) 6 SCC 287
- c. M/s. Dyna Technologies Pvt Ltd v. M/s Crompton Greaves Pvt. Ltd.
- d. Ssangyong v. National Highway Authority of India

22. Who was the judge in the above referred judgment?

- a. Justice N.V Ramana
- b. Justice R.F Nariman
- c. Justice A.M Khanwilkar
- d. Justice Ashok Bhushan

23. Which of the following encapsulates the primary finding of the court in the above referred judgment?

- a. An application under section 34 is a continuation of the arbitral proceeding.
- b. An application under section would automatically put a restrain on the award holder from executing the award.
- c. Arbitral proceedings that commence after 23rd October 2015, would require judgment debtors to obtain separate order of stay, failing which award holders will be free to execute the award.
- d. Arbitral proceedings that commence after 23rd October 2015, would require judgment debtors to obtain separate order of stay by depositing whole or part of the sum in dispute, failing which award holders will be free to execute the award.

24. When is arbitration proceeding presumed to commence?

- a. With the filling of the statement of claim by the claimant before the arbitrator.
- b. From the date when a notice under section 21 (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) is sent.
- c. From the date the first arbitral sitting is held.
- d. None of the above

25. Which of the following is not a duty of the arbitrator, as per section 31 of the Act?

- a. Must publish the award in writing.
- b. Must state the reasons for the award.
- c. Original signed copy of the award must be circulated to the parties.
- d. File an application for judgment upon award in competent court of civil jurisdiction

The next clause which requires interpretation is clause (ii) of sub-section 2(b) of Section 34 which inter alia provides that the Court may set aside arbitral award if it is in conflict with the 'Public Policy of India'. The phrase 'Public Policy of India' is not defined under the Act. Hence, the said term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the section and scheme of the Act. It has been repeatedly stated by various authorities that the expression 'public policy' does not admit of precise definition and may vary from generation to generation and from time to time. Hence, the concept 'public policy' is considered to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in which it is used. Lacking precedent the Court has to give its meaning in the light and principles underlying the Arbitration Act, Contract Act and Constitutional provisions.

26. The above excerpt is from which judgment?

- a. Renuagar Power Co. Ltd v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC644
- b. ONGC Ltd v. SAW Pipers Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705
- c. Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156
- d. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. State of U.P. (1974) 2 SCC 472

27. What were the pointers included into the definition of public policy in this judgment?

- i. fundamental policy of India**
- ii. The interest of India**
- iii. Justice and morality**
- iv. Sovereignty of India**
- v. International political relations**
- vi. patently illegal.**

- a. iv and v
- b. Only i
- c. i, ii, iii, iv and v
- d. i, ii, iii, vi

28. The definition of public policy as held in ONGC v. SAW pipes was over ruled and revised in which judgment?

- a. Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority; (2015) 3 SCC 49
- b. State of Rajasthan and Anr v. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd; (2009) 12 SCC 1
- c. Mc Dermott International INC v. Burn Standard co. ltd and ors; (2006) 11 SCC 181
- d. Gopal Chandra Mukherjee v. Food Corporation of India; AIR 2017 Cal 110

29. The Bench in ONGC v. SAW pipes was presided over by:

- a. Justice M.B Shah and Justice Arun Kumar
- b. Justice D.Y Chandrachud and Justice L. Nageswara Rao
- c. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Naveen Sinha
- d. Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice Vineet Saran

30. Under the Act of 1996, arbitrators are appointed as per section:

- a. 9
- b. 11
- c. 14
- d. 31

All of Fame's products are manufactured at its factory in Yangon, which has received international recognition for the quality of its production and management systems. In 2009, the company received ISO 9001:2008 certification for its quality management systems, ISO 14001:2004 for its environmental management systems and OHSAS 18001:2007 certification for its occupational health and safety systems related to its research, development and manufacturing of alternative medicine products. There are approximately 250 employees working at the factory, including scientists, doctors, pharmacists, biochemists, botanists, microbiologists and traditional medicine specialists. Ninety percent of manufacturing materials are taken from domestic sources, including from the company's medicinal herb garden located in northern Myanmar. Fame has ten offices and pharmacies in the major cities of Yangon, Mandalay and Tuangyi, and its products are distributed to more than one thousand pharmaceutical locations throughout the country. Fame products are also distributed internationally in Southeast Asia and other countries such as Germany, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

31. Which of the following is not a criteria for registration of a Design under Section 4 of the Designs Act, 2000?

- a. It is significantly distinguishable from known designs or obscene matter.
- b. If its use would be contrary to public order and morality.
- c. It has not been disclosed to the public.
- d. Must have an element of uniqueness to it.

32. Which section of the designs act provides an exception to the restriction 'Disclosure or publication of design' as provided in section 4 of the act.

- a. Section 14
- b. Section 15
- c. Section 16
- d. Section 17

33. Which of the following is not a condition to seek protection for display of design, at an exhibition as per section 21 of the Act, 2000?

- a. The provisions of section 21 should have been extended to the concerned exhibition by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
- b. The exhibitor exhibiting the design or article, or publishing a description of the design, gives the Controller previous notice in the prescribed form and ,
- c. The application for resignation of design must be made within six months from the date of exhibiting the design or article or publishing a description of the design.
- d. None of the above

34. Which of the following is not a ground for cancellation of registration as per section 19 of the Act of 2000?

- a. That the design has been previously registered in India.
- b. That the design is not a new and original design.
- c. That the design is directly in competition to some other existing business house as per the notification of the Competition Commission of India
- d. The design is not registrable under the Act.

In some countries, such as France and Italy, a magistrate conducts the investigation in cases of serious criminal offense, personally hearing witnesses and directing police to perform such relevant acts as the seizure of evidence.

In many other jurisdictions, as in the United States and Germany, magistrates do not organize or conduct the investigation. Their role is limited to authorizing particular acts of investigation involving serious invasions of civil rights—most important, instances of arrest, pretrial detention, search, seizure, and surveillance of mail and telecommunication. Generally, such acts are lawful only upon prior written judicial authorization (the warrant). Under U.S. law, warrants are issued only upon probable cause—that is, when there is evidence leading to a reasonable belief that the person to be arrested has

committed a crime or that an object connected with criminal activity can be found at the place to be searched. Other legal systems employ less-stringent standards of suspicion.

35. Which of the following is the incorrect power to pass a sentence?

- a. Metropolitan Magistrate- Imprisonment upto 3 years or/and fine up to Rs. 10,000.
- b. Judicial Magistrate/Special Judicial Magistrate of first class- Imprisonment up to 2 years or/and fine up to Rs. 10,000.
- c. Sessions Court: Any sentence authorized by law, death sentence is subject to confirmation by High Court
- d. Assistant Sessions Judge- imprisonment up to 10 years or and fine.

36. When can a police officer arrest without a warrant?

- a. Any person who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence.
- b. Against whom a reasonable complaints has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence.
- c. Who is suspected to be a deserter from any of the armed forces.
- d. All of the above.

37. Which of the following is not a duty of an officer making an arrest?

- a. Be in complete uniform.
- b. Have accurate and visible identification of his name.
- c. Prepare a memo of arrest.
- d. None of the above

38. Which of the following is not an after arrest procedure as per the Code of Criminal Procedure.

- a. Search of the residence of arrested person.
- b. Medical Examination of accused.
- c. Reports of arrest to be sent to the District Magistrate.
- d. Person arrested not to be discharged except on bail or bond

Kidnapping means stealing away of a man, woman, or child from their own country, and sending them into another. The literal meaning of kidnapping is “child stealing” and it has been given a wider connotation than its literal meaning. The major ingredient of kidnapping is that it involves taking away of a person without his/her consent or the consent of the lawful guardian. Kidnapping, according to Walker, is the common name for the common law offence of carrying away, or secreting, of any person against his will, or against the will of his lawful guardians. In common language the meaning of abduction is forcibly or fraudulently carrying away of a person. Abduction has been defined as the illegal act of

taking away a person by force, fraud or violence. In *Bahadur Ali v. King Emperor*^[2], the court held that where the accused represented himself as a police constable and kept the girl in his possession in his own house for a ransom of Rs. 600, such an act is the offence of abduction. In *Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana*^[3], the prosecutor was threatened with a pistol by the accused and forced to go with him, such taking away was held to be abduction.

39. What are the essentials for kidnapping a person from India:

- a. Conveying any person beyond the limits of India.
- b. Such Conveying must be without the consent of that person.
- c. Both a and c
- d. None of the above

40. Which of the following is not an essential for the offence of Kidnapping from lawful guardianship?

- a. Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind.
- b. The person in question, if a male must be under 16 years of age, if female them must be less than 18 years of age.
- c. Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian.
- d. Such taking must be with the ultimate object to gain some undue advantage from the local guardian of the minor.

41. A person arrested for charges under section 361 of the IPC, has the right to know the reasons for his arrest and has the right to inform his friends or relative or his attorney. This right of an arrested person was laid down in which case:

- a. *Shri D.K Basu and anr v. State of W.B and anr.*
- b. *Biswanath Mallick v. State of Orissa.*
- c. *S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras.*
- d. None of the above

42. The following are the essentials of _____

- i. **Forceful compulsion or inducement by deceitful means.**
- ii. **The object of such compulsion or inducement must be the going of a person from any place.**

Which offence is being described?

- a. Abduction

- b. Kidnapping with the intention of murder.
- c. Kidnapping for ransom.
- d. None of the above

Section 108 explains who is an abettor and Section 108-A provides for the case of abetments in India of an offence committed in a foreign country. Section 109 prescribes the punishment for the offence of abetment when the offence abetted is committed, while Section 110 prescribes the punishment for abetment where the person abetted commits the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the abettor. Section 111 provides for liability of abettor when one act abetted and other act done. Section 112 provides for cumulative punishment in cases covered by Section 111. Section 113 which is supplementary to Section 111 provides for punishment in cases where the act abetted causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor. Section 114 provides for cases where the abettor is present at the time of the offence, whereby he is deemed to have committed such and act or offence. Sections 115 and 116 prescribe for the punishment in cases where the offence abetted is not committed. Section 117 deals with abetment of offences by the public or by more than ten persons. Section 118 prescribes the penalty for concealing the existence of a design in another to commit a grave offence. Sections 119 and 120 provide for punishment in the case of public servants and others respectively for concealment of a design in another person to commit the offence not covered by Section 118

43. Under the Indian Penal Code, abetment is constituted:

- a. By instigating a person to commit an offence.
- b. By engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offence.
- c. By intentionally aiding a person to commit an offence.
- d. All of the above.

44. Which Section of the IPC deals with dowry deaths.

- a. 304-B
- b. 498-A
- c. 489-A
- d. 304-A

45. Which is the punishment for criminal breach of trust?

- a. 5 years or fine or both
- b. 3 years or fine or both

- c. 2 years or fine up to Rupees 10,000 or both
- d. 10 years or fine up to Rupees 10,000 or both

46. Criminal breach of trust is an offence under which section of the IPC

- a. Section 278
- b. Section 366
- c. section 406
- d. section 420

The special provision should exclude the general in its application to cases of criminal misappropriation & criminal breach of trust according to the ordinary rule of construction. This conclusion is unavoidable on a strict; construction of Section 181, Clause (2). If the intention of the Legislature had been to apply 3. 179 to cases of criminal breach of trust notwithstanding & comprehensive specific provision, this would have been expressly stated. There is nothing in the language of the Statute to indicate that such was the intention. Section 181, Clause (2) contains intrinsic evidence of its exclusive character. In regard to the offences of criminal breach of trust & criminal misappropriation, to avoid difficulties in cases where an act which forma part of the offence is committed at one place & another which completes it at another place, the Court within whose jurisdiction the property is received or retained is given jurisdiction along with the Court in whose jurisdiction the offence takes place which consists of the dishonest misappropriation, use or disposal, etc., of the property innocently received or retained. This scheme is very appropriate for the oases dealt with by this clause, for if Section 179 can apply only where the consequence is an ingredient of the offence itself, as held above, it would not cover oases of criminal breach of trust or of criminal misappropriation. In such cases the property is received or retained & then is dishonestly misappropriated. The offences are completed as soon as dishonest misappropriation, disposal or use, etc. take place.

47. Which of the following is not an essential for an act to come under section 414 of the IPC:

- a. Voluntary assistance in concealing or disposing of or making away with property.
- b. Knowledge or reason to believe that such property is stolen property.
- c. Both of the above
- d. None of the above

48. A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of which offence under the IPC"

- a. Criminal breach of trust
- b. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent
- c. Cheating
- d. Cheating by personation

49. The jurisdiction to try a person for an offence, depends which of the general principle of criminal law:

- a. Place of commission of such offence, within the local area of jurisdiction.
- b. The place where such person is found.
- c. Nationality of the person.
- d. None of the above

50. Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to...

- a. To do or cause to be done an illegal act
- b. Commit an offense
- c. Do or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means.
- d. All of the above

ANSWER KEY

1.	A
2.	D
3.	A
4.	B
5.	A
6.	A
7.	D
8.	B
9.	C
10.	C
11.	B
12.	A
13.	C
14.	D
15.	D
16.	A
17.	D
18.	D
19.	D

20.	A
21.	B
22.	B
23.	D
24.	B
25.	D
26.	B
27.	D
28.	A
29.	A
30.	B
31.	B
32.	C
33.	D
34.	C
35.	B
36.	D
37.	A
38.	A
39.	C
40.	D
41.	A
42.	A
43.	D
44.	A
45.	B
46.	C
47.	D
48.	C
49.	A
50.	C